The cognitive sciences, studying all forms of human and animal cognition, will pay due attention also to scientific cognition. Like other, more empirical-histori cal or sociological-ways of studying science, such cognitive studies of science need not compete with, but could be of service to, the philosophy of science. Yet, just as these other approaches have led to alternative, historicist or sociologistic, general philosophical views of science, so is the cognitive approach for many of its advocates essential, exclusively or not, to our general understanding of what scientific knowl edge and its acquisition really involve. The alternative views of science, including the cognitive approach are all more or less naturalistic. They distance themselves from traditional philosophical con cerns with the truth and rationality of science and the associated (supposedly) universally valid criteria and norms. They see the generation of scientific know ledge as a process to be explained, rather than to be shown as rationally justifiable. In the cognitive view, in particular, all human cognition is a natural process to be studied scientifically, by means of empirical and concrete explanatory models. There is a variety of cognitive models of scientific activity that have been employed (cf. Giere 1992, xvff.) : models from cognitive psychology, from the fields of computer science and artificial intelligence, and from the neurosciences. R. N. Giere (1992, xv) hopes "that the cognitive sciences might come to play the sort of role that formal logic played for logical empiricism or that history of science played for the historical school within the philosophy of science." Yet, he would not want to claim priority, let alone exclusivity, for any of the just-mentioned kinds of models. The new approach will mainly break with the idea of a categorical and universal rationality. The only notion of rationality that may play a role in cognitive models, according to him (Giere 1988, 7ff.) , is hypothetical rationality: the instrumental rationality of using effective means to a desired goal, where the determination of such effectiveness is a purely empirical matter. P. M. Churchland, whose views I shall primarily examine, has propounded much more radical claims (Churchland 1989 (Churchland , 1992a (Churchland , 1992b . He is a leading advo cate of the neuroscientific approach, enriched though with modelling ideas from connectionist AI. His neurocomputational approach is supposed to lead to an entirely new conception of science, which at best will vindicate a few of the views of some philosophers of science. It will break with traditional epistemology and, in particular, with "folk psychology", i.e. psychological accounts of human behavior in terms of beliefs and desires or other propositional attitudes.
The simple core of this radical debunking policy is Churchland's eliminative materialism: there is no mind, there are no mental states, there is only the brain and its operations.
In particular, he embraces "the premise that neuroscience is unlikely to find 'sentences in the head', or anything else that answers to the structure of individual beliefs and desires" (Churchland 1989, 125) . I shall not extensively deal with his eliminative material ism (for this, see e. g. Sharpe 1991 ).
The cognitive approach to science derives quite some plausibility from the idea that science after all is a cognitive activity of human individuals, and that any account of science will have to be compatible with what people, or human minds, or else human brains, do and can do. As Giere (1992, xxv) notes, "we must all agree that the neurosciences provide a powerful and indisputable constraint on any cognitive philosophy of science. Whatever cognitive model of scientific theorizing and reasoning one proposes, it must be a model that can be implemented by humans using human brains". This may sound trivial. Yet, what matters of course are the particular arguments and claims put forward in the name of such an idea. To Churchland (1989, 153ff) , e. g., his premise that there are no "sentences" , and there -fore surely also no deductive inferences between them , to be found in the brain is enough to conclude that the statement-view of scientific theories is wrong . He rejects proposed features of scientific cognition unless they have an analog in terms of the structure and operation of neurocomputational networks . Pure naturalists would aim at describing and explaining cognitive processes, and they would oppose any suggestion of justifying or normatively evaluating them. Neither Giere nor Churchland are pure naturalists in that sense. Both seem to be heeding H. Putnam's (1983, 246) warning that "the elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide". While Giere (1988, 161ff.) objects to viewing and justifying scientists' decision, e. g. their choice of a theory, as being rational in the sense of maximizing epistemic utility in a Bayesian fashion, he sketched a model of scientists as "satisficers" (following H. A. Simon). This provides a less demanding, but still normative evaluation of what scientists do. Churchland would have to reject such a decision-theoretic model, which still is formulated in "folk -psychological" terms of the values and interests of scientists. Yet, he claims that normative dimensions are not absent in his conception of cognition. This can be surprising: how could norms or even analogical counterparts of norms be found in the brain? My specific aim is to examine his claims and arguments concerning such normative dimensions. All naturalistic approaches face some well-known general problems. There is the problem-or charge-of circularity, which can take on several specific shapes and which becomes particularly urgent in regard of evaluative and normative considerations. Naturalists generally claim to be engaged in a scientific, non aprioristic, way of studying science; thus they appear to presuppose to know the ways of science, while still investigating and determining what they are. Similarly, the particular cognitivist claim that science can be studied as being an effective goal-directed activity can be charged, as Giere (1988, 10) himself has pointed out, with just presupposing the effectiveness of some means for reaching a certain goal. Otherwise he would, in an aprioristic fashion, have to justify his verdict on their effectiveness. A standard response has been that the circularity is not vicious, but consists rather of "positive feed-back loops" (e. g. Giere 1988, 10ff.) . Admittedly, scientists have effectively studied, and reached insights into the effectiveness and limitations of certain human cognitive capacities and certain scientific techniques and methods. Yet, the question remains whether all of human or scientific cogni tion can receive a naturalistic, or cognitivistic, account.
Naturalistic approaches also face a "problem of reflexivity", widely discussed in regard of comprehensive sociologistic views of science (cf. Kirschenmann 1990) . In the present context, it concerns the question of whether the generation of a naturalis tic, or cognitivistic, account of science could or should be explained in the same naturalistic, or cognitivistic, terms. This seems to be a particularly serious question for a radical cognitivist like Churchland: by his own terms, he should not have himself written in sentences or argued in deductive patterns.
His promissory Challenged by C. Glymour (1992, 465ff.) , Churchland (1992b, 476 ) enumerated some of the results that his neurocomputational approach has to his mind yielded so far. One of them "concerns the presumptive computational identity of three phe nomena counted as quite distinct from within common sense, namely perceptual recognition, explanatory understanding, and inference to the best explanation". What he means can be illustrated by a type of neural network that figures promi nently in his own writings (e. g. Churchland 1989, 159ff. and 200ff.; 1992a, 343ff.) , and which is also indispensable for an evaluation of his normative considerations.
The network consists of several layers of neuronlike units, each unit of one layer having synaptic connections with all the units of adjacent layers. The bottom layer consists of sensory neurons; when stimulated, it will have a certain pattern of activation across these input units, the "input vector". There are one or more hidden layers of units, which then get activated to various degrees, depending on the weight of the respective synaptic connections, by the input units. This gives rise to distinct patterns of activation, activations vectors, across the sets of hidden units. Finally, the topmost layer of output units also gets activated, which results in the "output vector" . The operation of the network amounts to a vector-vector transfor mation. Since the synaptic weights are variable, the network can "compute" any number of functions, which transform input into output vectors. A concrete techni cal example of Churchland's is a network that is supposed to discriminate between sonar echoes coming from under-water mines and sonar echoes from large submarine rocks. In this case, there are just two output units, one for 'mine' and for 'rock'.
Of course, such a network has to be "trained up" first: known stimuli-sonar echoes from known mines and rocks-are offered to the network, and errors in its output answers will lead to adjustments of the weights of synaptic connections according to a specific rule, until the network shows correct responses in its output. This particular learning procedure is known as "back-propagation (of error)" algo -rithm. Internally, the training has resulted in a partition of the space of possible activation patterns across the hidden units-in the example, a partition into two distinct regions: one of vector codings for a prototypical mine and another for prototypical rocks. Churchland's (1989, 209) "novel conception of cognitive activity, a conception in which coding and vector-to-vector transformation constitute the basic forms of representation and computation, rather than sentential structures and inferences made according to structure-sensitive rules". In more complex networks, the activation vector space of the hidden units is arranged in a tree-like hierarchy of types of activation vectors. Such networks can "partition that space into useful and well-organized categories relative to the functional task that they are required to perform" (Churchland 1992a, 352) . Real brains consist of many cooperating networks; and "the input to a given bank of hidden units comes not just from the sensory periphery, but from elsewhere in the brain itself. The brain is a recurrent network." (Churchland 1989, 208) The simple type of network can surely count as a model of perceptual recogni tion. It can show that perception, at least in the learning phase, is not passive, but and active and corrective process; once trained, though, its perceptual recognition has become an automatic activation of the relevant prototype. In what sense, however, can it also serve as a model of explanation? Churchland prefers to speak of "explanatory understanding", which he can more easily assimilate to the same model: "Explanatory understanding consist in the activation of a specific prototype vector in a well-trained network. It consists in the apprehension of the problematic case as an instance of a general type, a type for which the creature has a detailed and well-informed representation." (Churchland 1989, 210) This is rather uninformative. As concerns the "presumptive computational identity" of different kinds of cognitive processes, it amounts to little more than saying that there is a common feature of "falling into place" ("activating some prototype") in all of them. To be sure, Churchland (1989, 198 ) notes certain differences: the prototype vectors activated in explanatory understanding have a more elaborate structure; they can be activated, not only by perceptual or sensory, but also by other cognitive circumstances. Also he distinguishes between different types of explanatory understanding (those of co-occurrent properties, causal rela tions, functional relations, etc.); yet, he does so, it seems to me, by just postulating different suitable corresponding prototypes.
Churchland opposes his prototype-activation (PA) model of explanatory under standing to the familiar deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation, which to him is psychologically unrealistic (Churchland 1989, 198ff. and 223ff.) . People, he argues, have an explanatory understanding of what happens around them, without being able to voice general laws and initial conditions, which are required in the D-N model. Also, they commonly attain it at great speed, while the assem blage of the relevant premises and the execution of the relevant deductive inferences would take quite some time. I shall make some comments countering this kind of criticism.
Against its intentions, Churchland reinterprets that D-N model in psychological or, rather, neuro-computational terms. It was meant to characterize the logical structure of scientific explanatory accounts, not the psychological processes leading to having an explanation or the resulting subjective state of understanding. There need not be any conflict between these two aspects of explanatory endeavors. Churchland's tendency to confuse them is especially apparent in his speed argument. Even though scientists in a well-explored and theoretically well-covered domain will understand without much delay why a particular event happened, it is equally true that they usually will have spent years of exploring it and articulating explanatory accounts for its phenomena. (As we shall see below, Churchland seems to want to turn this arduous part of scientific inquiry into an exploration of our own conceptual space.) To be sure, Churchland (1989, 224) grants that D-N arguments can "success -fully evoke explanatory understanding in the hearer... But they do not embody, or account for the understanding itself." Stressing the occurrence of understanding, he neglects the specific character of scientific problems and goals, which give structure to the exploration of a domain.
What is more, in such explorations, experimenters will have built devices for creating the phenomena in question, and theoreticians will have filled stacks of paper and plenty of computer space with formulas and calculations. Granted, these must also all be activities within the capabilities of human bodies and brains. Yet, to a great extent, such operations have an objective mode of occurrence, external to the scientists, within the wider, material and social, context of scientific work. They need not be literally or analogously be present or represented in their brains. To be sure, again, Chrchland (1989, 195) at least concedes that such cognitive activities might possess a special character: while claiming that his "picture of learning and cognitive activity.. encompasses the entire animal kingdom" , he adds that it "remains for this approach to comprehend the highly discursive and linguistic dimensions of human cognition, those that motivated the classical view of cogni tion." Yet, so far, his arguments against the D-N model of explanation either just repeat the basic tenets of his eliminative materialism or else must be judged to be beside the point.
Theories, finally, do not differ that much for Churchland from concepts either . A theory or conceptual framework had been for him a certain configuration of synaptic weights. In this sense, having a theory is not a rare , but a common cognitive state: "An individual's theory-of-the-world .. is a specific point in that individual's synaptic weight space . It is a configuration that partitions the system's activation-vector space(s) into useful divisions and subdivisions relative to the input typically fed to the system ." (Churchland 1989, 177) . Gradually, he came to think that it was more appropriate to regard a theory as a certain partition in activation space (Churchland 1989 , 234) and thus "just a highly structured proto- type" (Churchland 1992b, 477) . On either view, it is a configuration which, together with an input vector, determines the prototype activated and the output vector. In this sense, all perception of whichever creature is definitely influenced by the theory it has. This is Churchland's (1989, e. g. 146, 188 and passim; 1992a, 354ff .) reconstruction, and therefore vindication, of the philosophical view that all observation is theory-laden. This view is thus literally being placed on the same level with perceptual bias, which in the origination of the view played the role of a mere analogy.
Related to his novel conception of theories, there is another result of his approach considered noteworthy by Churchland (1992b, 476) : it "concerns the unexpected size of the human conceptual space.. and the explorational difficulties that this superastronomical volume entails". According to his estimates (Church land 1989, 249ff.) , there is indeed an enormous number of different possible synaptic weight distributions over the neurons of the human brain, or different possible conceptual configurations. This turns all science into neuroscience: he makes it appear as if the point of scientific inquiry were just the exploration of all these possibilities internal to the brain, with hope of so discovering the "final, true theory of the cosmos" (Churchland 1989, 253) . Furthermore, he deems our native cognitive resources to be inadequate to this enormous exploratory task; we shall have to turn to automated science, employing artificial neural networks. (While praising here his neurocomputational insight into the difficulties of coming by definitive explana tory theories, Churchland (1989, 218ff .) previously-and arbitrarily, to my mind -used the "literal infinity of possible hypotheses that might be posed in explana tion" as an argument against the analysis of explanation in terms of statements and inferences.)
Rounding off his approach, Churchland (1989, 297ff.) has asserted that neural network models cover, not only factual or scientific, but also moral knowledge-thus eliminating a further traditional distinction. "On these neurocomputational models, knowledge acquisition is primarily a process of learning how: how to recognize a wide variety of complex situations and how to respond to them appropri ately. The quality of one's knowledge is measured not by any uniform correspon dence between internal sentences and external facts, but by the quality of one's continuing performance. From this perspective, moral knowledge does not auto -matically suffer by contrast with other forms of knowledge. To the contrary, praxis now appears primary. It is theoria that stands in need of explanation." (Church land 1989, 298) . Moral knowledge, simply, also consists of the activation of appro priate prototypes: children learn to recognize, and complain about, an unfair distribution of cookies; they thus are learning "the structure of social space and how best to navigate one's way through it." (Churchland 1989, 299f .) Churchland, then, is not only a radical, materialistic, naturalist in the philosophy of cognition and science, but also an extreme, while rather uncritical, naturalist and cognitivist in the sense current in metaethics: we can directly perceive objectively existing moral facts.
Churchland realizes that the learning of moral facts, as described by him, could appear to be a process of mere socialization, as distinct from having true, critically employable, moral knowledge-a distinction which he does not want to collapse. Moral progress is no less possible than scientific progress: "There is no reason why our moral consciousness and moral understanding should not continue to improve and deepen indefinitely, just as our nonsocial perception and our theoretical science may do so. For in fact we do have an organ for understanding and recognizing moral facts. It is called the brain." (Churchland 1989, 303) . One just attributes the required capacities to the human brain: "When such powerful learning net works as humans are confronted with the problem of how best to perceive the social world, and how best to conduct one's affairs within it, we have equally good reason to expect that the learning process will show an integrity comparable to that shown on other learning tasks, and will produce cognitive achievements as robust as those produced anywhere else." (Churchland 1989, 301) . The allusions to best ways of functioning and to progress therein clearly address important normative issues. give an answer to this question. He has rejected it and its methodological criteria, as if this was a plain consequence of psychological, neurocomputational facts. Yet, he has made clear that normative considerations have a place in his approach, too. In his view, the normative question raised becomes a question of the appropriateness of an activated prototype, which he has specified in terms of certain possible "epistemic virtues" it can have.
He starts by commenting on the idea of "inference to the best explanation", offered by certain traditional philosophers as an account of which beliefs we acquire, namely those having greater explanatory power than other beliefs. To him, the idea is problematic, again because it suggests a comparativ choice made between alternatives, whereas typically beliefs come about rather swiftly, without the presence of alternatives.
In line with his allegedly more realistic approach, he suggests that "we can begin to explicate the crude notion of 'inference to the best explanation' with the more penetrating notion of 'activation of the most appropriate prototype vector'." (Churchland 1989, 218 ) What does he mean by 'appropriate ', or -8- how are explanations then to be evaluated in his approach? Churchland (1989, 223) sums up his discussion of these questions as follows: "A virtuous mode of explanatory understanding (that is, an activated prototype vector) should be a rich portrait of the general type at issue; it should be strongly warranted (that is, have low ambiguity in the input that occasions it); it should be correct (relative to the library of currently available alternative prototypes); and it should be the most unified cognitive configuration possible. Evidently, normative epistemology is not essentially tied to a propositional-attitude conception of cognitive activity."
I shall comment only on the two last-mentioned epistemic virtues. As concerns correctness, Churchland points out that a prototype can be wrong or misrepresent a given situation in the sense that other perceptual or cognitive angles of the network would "reliably" activate another vector. This is a weak internal-comparison or internal-agreement view of correctness, which presupposes that some forms of activation are correct in a stronger sense. That sense can be gathered from Churchland's (1989, 221) addition that the behavioral consequences of an incorrect prototype "may be highly, even lethally, inappropriate to the problematic situation in question".
In this way correctness is being interpreted as what is conducive to the survival of neural networks.
The norms for good explanations or the respective "epistemic virtues", as he fittingly prefers to call them (as good explanations contribute to the good life of the network), are thus being subordinated to certain pragmatic values. This is not surprising, since Churchland does not wish to avail himself to the traditional philosophical notions of truth and reference, which pertain to propositions.
Yet, one wonders why he nonetheless takes such norms or virtues to be epistemic. And it is hard to see how, along these lines, he could give an adequate account of the "life of science".
It is telling, though little surprising, that he does not tie correctness of prototype activation to well-testedness or elaborate on any analog of the familiar requirement of testability. The role of the requirement that hypotheses, or premises of explana tions, be well-confirmed through rigorous testing is, as it were, taken over by one part of the desideratum that networks be well-trained. After all, as Churchland (1989, 218) states: "Activating the most appropriate available prototype is what a well -trained network does as a matter of course, and it does it directly, in response to the input, without canvassing a single alternative vector." Yet, training up a network by means of some learning procedure has two sides to it. It results in a particular synaptic weight configuration with ensuing prototypical reactions, and it does so in a controlled, error-correcting, fashion. This is the picture of a self-justifying process of generating concepts or explanations: concepts or hypotheses, as it were, are not produced independently of their being tested. An additional, separate requirement of testing or even testability does then not seem to be called for.
There are only a few explicit comments on the testing of alternative theories or more global "conceptual configurations", such as the wave and particle theories of light. Churchland (1992b, 478) states: "One can systematically apprehend optical phenomena as wave phenomena, or as particle phenomena. And one can explore at length the subsequent rewards or disappointments that each mode of apprehension brings with it. In this way are theories 'tested', whether one is a juvenile mouse or an aging human scientist." The overly general terms 'rewards or disappointments', probably again, refer to pragmatized final values, life values: differences between mice and scientists can thus be made to disapper. Note, though, that Churchland concedes here-or rather adds the assumption-that the working of networks may not always be that fully automatic: they can comprise units with some freedom, which can switch on and off alternative modes of operation.
Let me turn now to the desideratum of unity, discussed by Churchland in connection with simplicity, which is for him the most important dimension of evaluating explanatory understanding.
As a noteworthy result, Churchland (1992b, 479) specifically mentions his "novel account of what simplicity/unity is, and why it is an epistemic virtue. .. it constitutes an unexpected success on the normative front, and at a specific place, moreover, where traditional approaches have proved a chronic failure".
He is referring here to the known difficulties of providing a general, possibly quantitative, characterization of the simplicity of scientific hypotheses, and also to the unresolved dispute over whether simplicity is an epis temic criterion at all or rather a purely pragmatic-economical or aesthetic one.
The noteworthy insight (Churchland 1989, 179ff .)-interesting in itself-is that there is some optimal number of hidden units for networks of the type meant to discriminate between rocks and mines. If there are fewer, the network will not even learn to respond appropriately during training: it just lacks the resources for capturing the uniformities in mine and in rock echoes in corresponding activation vectors. If there are more, the network will have learned well during training, but will fail later: "it will generalize to new samples only very poorly". The reason is that it was lazy in its "theorizing": it had ample resources to develop a distinct representation for each mine aand rock in the training set. In this ad hoc fashion, it formed a mere "look-up table" for them; it was not forced to form common representations, i.e. "simpler hypotheses". To Churchland, this yields the significant result that, ceteris paribus, "the simpler hypotheses generalize better" . Or, (Churchland 1992b, 479) : "Ceteris paribus, an activated prototype is better if it is part of the most unified conceptual configuration. What simplicity and unity amount to is .. that networks that have formed the simplest or most unified partitions across their activation spaces are networks that do much better at general izing their knowledge to novel cases." Does the example actually show as much? It certainly shows , to use tradi-tional terms, that without a general, common concept or at least similarity notion one cannot generalize at all. More specifically, it shows the almost tautological circumstance that without prior generalization there can be no subsumption of future cases under it. And, in fact, the overly resourceful network does not general ize at all. In this sense, the example has not shown that, of several given hypoth eses which all involve general terms, the simpler ones generalize better.
A further question is what quality is being displayed by a successful network of this kind. While Churchland (1989, 181) takes it to be a pragmatic virtue that an optimally structured and functioning network gets by with fewer or simpler resources, "this is not the principal virtue here displayed.
Superior generalization is a genuinely epistemic virtue ..".
Furthermore, such a network "displays an unexpected connection between representational economy, conceptual unification and the capacity for successfully generalizing past experience to novel cases." (Churchland 1989, 221 .) Insofar as 'superior generalization' can be taken to mean successful prediction, it can no doubt count as an epistemic asset of a hypothesis or theory; this quality will then also figure in the explanation of pragmatic successes of one who uses the theory.
If the simplicity of the theory has essentially contribut ed to its predictive success, simplicity can be regarded as an epistemic asset in this case, too. It is then likely that simplicity is of the correct kind. In other cases, simplicity need not be an epistemic asset. What is the normative force of Churchland's insights in, and evaluation of, the functioning of such networks? In pragmatical or technical respects, one could say that they enjoin us to build simple networks-or rather, though somewhat more truistically, optimally structured and functioning networks. Further, as Church land (1989, 180) has noted, they can be taken to tell us that we should force networks "to avoid ad hoc , unprojectible learning". As we have just seen, though, the relevance of such a recommendation will decisively depend on the task to be accomplished. In epistemic respects, it tells us at least, again rather truistically, that one should employ general notions or representations when known and yet unknown objects are to be recognized as falling into particular categories. All in all, the insight that, in the case of certain networks, "simpler hypotheses generalize better" cannot be the basis for a generally valid epistemic criterion of simplicity, as Churchland (1989, 181) emphasizes himself: "nothing guarantees succcssful general ization". Add here that generality itself is also certainly not an absolute or generally valid norm for hypotheses; it is always restricted by other epistemic criteria. Churchland (1989, 145ff .) also gives a very general argument for considering simplicity, conceptual unity, explanatory power and related features of theories as epistemic virtues; in fact, it is an argument for the "primacy", or inevitability, of such "superempirical virtues", as he calls them in contradistinction with, say, sensitivity or adequacy to empirical data. It is directed against full-blooded empiricists, for whom such features are purely pragmatic and lack any epistemic import. The argument simply makes use of his earlier-mentioned version of the "theory -ladenness" of all cognition: "Since there is no way of conceiving or re presenting 'the empirical facts' that is completely independent of speculative assumptions, .. it is clear that the epistemic choice between .. global alternatives cannot be made by comparing the extent to which they are adequate to some common touchstone, 'the empirical facts'." Thus, it follows that the choice must be made on the basis of their comparative global virtues.
The argument is correct as far as it goes: it indeed shows that the choice between global theoretical alternatives, in such cases, has to be made on "super empirical grounds", but it does not force us to conclude that "superempirical virtues" therefore have epistemic import. Churchland adds that they "are some of the brain's most basic criteria for recognizing information, for distinguishing infor mation from noise", indeed (Churchland 1989, 242) : "The impulse toward unity is vitally important in any cognitive creature, an impulse coequal with sensitivity to data, ..".
Thus, again, the value of "superempirical virtues" is after all being subordinated to, and made derivative on, pragmatic survival values , which certainly does not strengthen their case of being epistemic.
Let me add that the argument does not directly bear on the earlier discussion of mine-rock kinds of networks themselves, as such a network does not choose itself between alternative global categorizations on the bases of their simplicity or unity . (1992a) has endeavored to give neurocomputational arguments in favor of two "Feyerabendian themes" of this kind . The first "theme" is that scientific progress is sometimes dependent on the proliferation of theories or conceptual frameworks. This idea or requirement is supported, according to Churchland, by the neuro computational finding that not all empirical facts are equally accessible for a network with one configuration of synaptic weights.
On and off, especially when stuck in one configuration, a network should move to other configurations. Such argumentations are exercises in merely analogizing, while not reinforcing, the "theme" in neurocomputational terms .
The second "theme" is that scientific progress even requires the proliferation of research methodologies. This injunction, for Churchland, has to do with the proliferation, and exploration of the merits, of alternative learning algorithms. He takes it that this opportunistic methodological anarchism was advocated, "con strained only by the innate organization of the human nervous system" (Churchland 1992a, 360 ); yet, he suggests that this constraint will have to be dropped. For, the task of exploring alternative learning algorithms may even exceed the operational capacities of the human brain and, in this case, will have to be done by artificial brains. Remember his similar suggestion regarding the exploration of our conce ptual space. These are strange admissions, which disown Giere's general justification of the neuroscientific approach: the human brain then is no longer a constraint on scientific development and progress; in building artificial brains, which now are meant to explore also the space of alternative learning procedures, it surpasses itself.
In support of his suggestions, Churchland (1992a, 361f.) refers to recent "aston ishing feats of knowledge acquisition" of artificial networks, which were guided by "a variety of nonclassical learning algorithms" . Thus, a "new door has opened in normative epistemology, and it concerns the comparative virtues and capabilities of alternative learning algorithms ..".
He gives two reasons for encouraging this development: we need to locate the brain's mode of operation in the space of possible learning algorithms, and we need to find out whether there are any better ones. When doing so, "our acquired methodological wisdom may equal or surpass that innate wisdom of a healthy nervous system, because we have figured out how the nervous system works, and can see how to make it work even better".
What becomes especially apparent in this way of discussing scientific cognition and development is that Churchland cannot avoid departing from his professed eliminative materialism.
In its place, he actually employs a dualism of neural structures and mechanisms, on the one hand, and learning algorithms, on the other.
This dualism has already clearly been present in the discussion of the mine-rock network, whose manner of learning was supervised, imposed from the outside. Of course, certain learning algorithms are "hard-wired" in the brain; yet, the space of possible learning procedures, which could be implemented in the brain or in artificial networks is much larger.
In exploring it, we have seen, the brain surpasses itself. 
Concluding Remarks
Many aspects of Churchland's views, not touched on here, have been critically examined by others (see e. g. Derksen 1993) . The convergent judgment is that his approach is quite one-sided. This holds, in particular, for his views on scientific cognition. Rather obviously, they represent a "cognitive individualism" which all but neglects the social nature of science (Dowses 1993; also Thagard 1994) . And they fall short, as we have seen, of providing satisfactory treatments of normative issues of scientific knowledge. One reason here is his levelling of all forms of cognition, by means of weak analogies , say, between scientific cognition and percep tion. Further, the virtues of networks , as described by him, cannot count as epistemic virtues, but only as pragmatic virtues of survival and well-functioning . The decision to insist on this pragmatic perspective or , more specifically, the declaration that neuroscience and connectionist AI are the only relevant sciences for the cognitive approach, is itself a grand normative philosophical choice . This quite a priori choice, backed up by the metaphysical naturalism of his eliminative materialism, can also been seen as his response to the circularity problem . The a -14-priori character of this choice cannot be fully concealed by a promise that the neurocomputational approach will take the field in the future and subdue all forms of traditional epistemology and philosophy of science.
